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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
state. In the second case the Court ruled that a divorced wife for
all purposes of giving testimony "was still the wife of the plaintiff not-
withstanding the decree of divorce had been entered a few weeks pre-
viously."
The Illinois court of last resort held that William could not again
marry anywhere until this divorce became absolute. Hence, his at-
tempted remarriage was void and Hannah Wilcox was not the lawful
wife of her ex-husband. A similar statute prevails in Illinois.3
We quote the Illinois court as follows: "It follows, therefore, that
under the laws of this state on October 2, 1922, when the marriage
ceremony was last performed between Hannah and William Wilcox,
the courts of this state would not recognize as valid an attempted mar-
riage of one who was defendant in a divorce proceeding in the State of
Wisconsin, where such attempted marriage took place within one year
from the date of the decree of divorce.
Stevens v. Stevens4 and Wilson v. Cook 5 are two Illinois cases cited
by that court in support of its contentions. The Stevens case held that
a marriage contracted in another state in violation of the section of.
the statute quoted was absolutely void. The second case6 cites cases
about which the court says: "these cases sustain the principle that.
where a state has enacted a statute lawfully imposing upon its citizens
an incapacity to contract marriage by reason of a positive policy of
the state for the protection of the morals and good order of society,
against serious social evils, a marriage contracted in disregard of the
prohibition of the statute, wherever celebrated, will be void." The
award was set aside by the Supreme Court and the judgment reversed.
SAM GOLDENBERG
Constitutional Law-Due process:
A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court' has caused
a great deal of comment and discussion not only among members of
the bar, but also among a large number of thinking Americans; who
fear that this decision is a step in the wrong direction, and leads to
the belittling and crumbling of that bulwark of personal liberty which
the courts have so zealously preserved against the mistaken efforts of
those who have believed that the end justifies the means in the con-
' Sec. ia of the Divorce Act, Hurd's Revised Stat. 1921, C. 40.
4304 Ill. 297. 136 N.E. 785.
6256 Ill. 46o. Ioo N.E. 222. 43 L.A.R. (N.S.) 315.
6 Brook v. Brook 9 H.L. Cas. 193; Lussex Peerage Case, II CI. & F. 85;
State v. Tuhy (c.c.), 41 Fed. 753. 7 L.R.A. 5o; Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn.
244, S.W. 309, 2 L.R.A. 703, IO; McLennan v. McLennanr, 31 Or. 480; 50 Pac.
802; Stulls Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16.
SOlm.stead v. U.S. Sup. ct. Advance Sheets Jul. 2, 1928, p. 662.
NOTES AND COMMENT
viction of criminals. I refer to what is already familiarly known as the
"Wire Tapping Case," where Chief Justice Taft, on behalf of the
majority of the court, upheld the admission of evidence obtained almost
solely by wiretapping in the State of Washington, where, by statute,
wiretapping is made a misdemeanor! The case was a conspiracy of
huge ramifications against the Volstead Act, and it may have been
the magnitude of the operations, together with the fact that the gov-
ernment claimed that it could obtain the evidence in no other way,
which impelled the majority to what may aptly be termed a "main
force" decision. The court overruled the objection that the admission
of this evidence was a violation of the Fifth Amendment in that it re-
quired the prisoner to testify against himself, by saying that he was
not forced to make these telephone calls, and also held that the means
used did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. It was also
urged that the court should frown on the unethical means, not to say
crimes, by which the mass of evidence, consisting of several hundred
pages, was obtained, but the court was able to dispose of this objection
by pointing that at common law, it made no difference by what means
the evidence was obtained, and the Federal Court sitting in the State
of Washington followed the rules of evidence of the common law.
Four justices, for whom Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis wrote
able dissenting opinions, pointed out that this decision was contra to
the long line of cases in which the Supreme Court has assiduously re-
jected evidence obtained by unlawful means of governmental agents.
They also declared that the government should always use ethical
means in obtaining evidence, and that at the risk of losing a conviction
in a particular case it should be the last to encroach on the individual
rights and liberties of its citizens.
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